ABSTRACT

Purpose: The study looks at the South African migration policy on the Zimbabwean special permit renewal experience. Once regarded as the doyen of Africa, Zimbabwe’s economic crisis and political upheaval forced citizens to migrate to South Africa, because, she serves as regional power for peace and security.

Theoretical reference: Warm hospitality and ‘ubuntu’ (humanity towards others) extended to Zimbabwean migrants resulted in the Dispensation of Zimbabwean Project (DZP) permit introduction to legalise them not to be ‘undesirable’ migrants. In 2014 the DZP was changed to Zimbabwean Special Permit (ZSP) and expired in 2017.

Method: The paper adopts systematic literature review (SLR) research for the study. The journal article selections start from the year 2010 to 2022. The twelve (12) years duration for the literature review was done to get access to the current information about the topic under discussion. As a result exclusions and inclusions were done regards to the migration diplomacy, coercing, and weapons for power.

Results and Conclusion: The finding reveals, that harassment, deportability, pressure group formation and short-term permit renewal are adopted, to be recognised, powerful, and improve reputation and status globally. However, whether migration tools engaged in to achieve such goals would be successful remains blurred, since South Africa recently extended the ZEP for another six months to 31 December 2023.

Implications of research: The paper contributes to the South-South migration literature which is understudied and recommends empirical studies to unravel hidden intentions.

Originality/value: The pressure groups and vigilante such as Operation Dulula and #PutSouthAfricaFirst emerged and exerted excessive pressure on the government to deport the foreigners from the country. This finding is not different from what Durand, Massey and Parrado found that during the contraction periods of the economy the host nation’s, pressure groups and union’s demands the expulsion of the migrant.

Keywords: deportability, migration diplomacy, repatriation, South Africa, Zimbabwean.

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POLÍTICA DE MIGRACIÓN SUL-AFRICANA NA EXPERIÊNCIA DE RENOVACIÓN DE AUTORIZACIÓN ESPECIAL DO ZIMBÁBUE: DIPLOMACIA DE ARMAS PARA O PODER

RESUMO

Objetivo: O estudo analisa a política de migração sul-africana na experiência de renovação de autorização especial do Zimbábue. Antes considerado o decano da África, a crise econômica e a agitação política do Zimbábue forçaram os cidadãos a migram para a África do Sul, porque ela serve como potência regional para a paz e a segurança.


Método: O artigo adota pesquisa de revisão sistemática da literatura (SLR) para o estudo. As seleções de artigos de periódicos começam no ano de 2010 a 2022. A duração de doze (12) anos para a revisão da literatura foi feita para obter acesso às informações atuais sobre o tópico em discussão. Como resultado, exclusões e inclusões foram feitas em relação à diplomacia de migração, coerção e armas para poder.

Resultados e conclusão: A descoberta revela que assédio, deportabilidade, formação de grupos de pressão e renovação de permissão de curto prazo são adotados para serem reconhecidos, poderosos e melhorar a reputação e o status globalmente. No entanto, se as ferramentas de migração envolvidas para atingir tais objetivos seriam bem-sucedidas permanece obscuro, já que a África do Sul estendeu recentemente o ZEP por mais seis meses até 31 de dezembro de 2023.

Implicações da pesquisa: O artigo contribui para a literatura de migração Sul-Sul que é pouco estudada e recomenda estudos empíricos para desvendar intenções ocultas.

Originalidade/valor: Os grupos de pressão e vigilantes como a Operação Dulula e #PutSouthAfricaFirst surgiram e exerceram pressão excessiva sobre o governo para deportar os estrangeiros do país. Esta descoberta não é diferente do que Durand, Massey e Parrado descobriram que durante os periodos de contração da economia, a nação anfitriã, os grupos de pressão e o sindicato exigem a expulsão do migrante.

Referencia teórica: La cálida hospitalidad y el "ubuntu" (humanidad hacia los demás) que se brindaron a los migrantes zimbabuenses dieron como resultado la introducción del permiso del Proyecto de Dispensación de Zimbabwe (DZP, por sus siglas en inglés) para legalizarlos y que no fueran migrantes "indeseables". En 2014, el DZP se cambió al Permiso Especial de Zimbabwe (ZSP, por sus siglas en inglés) y expiró en 2017.

Método: El artículo adopta una investigación de revisión sistemática de la literatura (SLR, por sus siglas en inglés) para el estudio. Las selecciones de artículos de revistas comienzan desde el año 2010 hasta el 2022. La duración de doce (12) años de la revisión de la literatura se realizó para obtener acceso a la información actual sobre el tema en discusión. Como resultado, se hicieron exclusiones e inclusiones en relación con la diplomacia migratoria, la coerción y las armas de poder.

Resultados y conclusión: El hallazgo revela que el acoso, la deportación, la formación de grupos de presión y la renovación de permisos a corto plazo se adoptan para ser reconocidos, poderosos y mejorar la reputación y el estatus a nivel mundial. Sin embargo, no está claro si las herramientas migratorias utilizadas para lograr tales objetivos serían exitosas, ya que Sudáfrica recientemente extendió la ZEP por otros seis meses hasta el 31 de diciembre de 2023.

Implicaciones de la investigación: El documento contribuye a la literatura sobre migración Sur-Sur que está poco estudiada y recomienda estudios empíricos para desentrañar las intenciones ocultas.

Originalidad/valor: Los grupos de presión y vigilantes como Operation Dulula y #PutSouthAfricaFirst surgieron y ejercieron una presión excesiva sobre el gobierno para que deportara a los extranjeros del país. Este hallazgo no es diferente de lo que Durand, Massey y Parrado encontraron que durante los períodos de contracción de la economía, las naciones anfitrionas, los grupos de presión y los sindicatos exigen la expulsión del migrante.

Palabras clave: deportabilidad, diplomacia migratoria, repatriación, Sudáfrica, Zimbabwe.

1 INTRODUCTION

The study examined the South African migration policy with a focus on the Zimbabwean special permit renewal. A significant aspect of South Africa's history has been migration. The nation is founded on migration, either people migrate domestically, from rural to urban and industrialized areas, or people migrate abroad, coming to South Africa as contract workers in quest of employment to make a better life for themselves and their families. South Africa has traditionally been the region's top destination nation, but since the 1990s, migratory trends have shifted.3

Apartheid regulations began to be loosened in 1990, and when the regime was overthrown in 1994, South Africa transformed into a society that was more open, diverse, and inclusive. Regular migration from other African nations also began to occur.4 Despite

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3 Segatti & Landau, 2011
4 Adjai & Lazaridis, 2013
this lengthy past, there is still debate in South Africa regarding migration and the place of migrants in both practice and policy.\textsuperscript{5} This is evident in the way that migrants are treated and spoken about in the country’s polity.\textsuperscript{6} A person who has lived outside their place of birth for a year or more is considered a migrant, according to the United Nations.\textsuperscript{7}

According to estimates, the population of such individuals increased from 111 million to 214 million, or nearly double, between 1985 and 2010.\textsuperscript{8} That may seem like a significant increase,\textsuperscript{9} but despite the growing world population, the proportion of migrants has remained relatively stable throughout the years, at roughly 3\% of the total population. That being said, there are differences in the amount of migrants in every society on the planet.\textsuperscript{10} The majority of migrants reside in industrialized nations, which account for around one-seventh of the global population but are home to 60\% of all migrants.

\textbf{2 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY}

The study adopts a systematic literature review (SLR), which involves the collection of existing research information considered to be relevant and important for the study.\textsuperscript{11} SLR is defined as ‘the process of accessing published secondary data’.\textsuperscript{12} The definition shows two distinct features. This indicates that SLR engages in only published secondary data. The published is broadly used, which comprises journals, books, articles, indexes in many databases, and organisational and non-organisational reports.\textsuperscript{13} In other words, it shows that the secondary data ‘already exists and has been collected in the past for some purpose quite unconnected to our project’.\textsuperscript{14}

The second characteristics indicates that the SLR is undertaken ‘in-house’.\textsuperscript{15} This signifies that fieldwork was not carried out for this research, but rather the existing literature was critically analysed and evaluated for the study.\textsuperscript{16} Google Scholars and Web

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\footnotesize 5 Dlamini, Adetiba, Enaifoghe & Mlambo, 2020
\footnotesize 6 Enaifoghe, 2020
\footnotesize 7 United Nations, 2010
\footnotesize 8 United Nations, 2011
\footnotesize 9 Crush and Frayne, 2010
\footnotesize 10 Enaifoghe, 2020
\footnotesize 11 Yin, 2014
\footnotesize 12 Jackson, 1994, p. 21
\footnotesize 13 Yin, 2017; Jackson, 1994
\footnotesize 14 Jackson, 1994, p. 20
\footnotesize 15 Jackson, 1994, p. 20
\footnotesize 16 Creswell, 2007; Jackson, 1994

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of Science search engines were identified and selected for shifting of the existing literatures related to the migration diplomacy, coercing, and weapons for power. The journal article selections start from the year 2010 to 2022. The twelve (12) years duration for the literature review was done to get access to the current information about the topic under discussion.

As a result exclusions and inclusions were done regards to the migration diplomacy, coercing, and weapons for power. Peer review journals relate to the topic were shifted and selected.\textsuperscript{17} Further, magazines, newspapers, internet information relevant to the study were accessed. So to it, some official government documents, reports, and public statements published in news papers reviewed. Further, steps were taken to extract and compile the relevant articles as well as literature review inclusions involve journal articles significant to the topic and the research questions. The paper review process began in 1 March, 2023 and ends in 15 July, 2023.

Articles selected for review gives in-depth knowledge about the migration diplomacy, coercing, and weapons for power. Articles that appeared were read carefully, this enables themes formulated to answer topic and the research questions. Data is analysed based on the themes that emerged. Procedures were taken to develop guidelines for integrative and systematic narrative review for the write-up. However, the limitations could be that since not all academic search engines were explored there could be some few existing literatures that the authors might not use.

3 SOUTH AFRICAN MIGRATION POLICY ON SPECIAL PERMITS: THE ZIMBABWEAN EXPERIENCE

Once regarded as the jewels of Africa and the leading producer of goods and services on the African continent, plunged into political instability, economic meltdown, turmoil and woes in 2008, resulting in the collapse of the Zimbabwean economy.\textsuperscript{18} Life was unbearable; the untold hardship was glaring and ‘written’ on the forehead of the citizens. The basic and necessary goods became luxury and were imported from other

\textsuperscript{17} Creswell, 2007

\textsuperscript{18} Hammar, McGregor, and Landau, 2010; Crush and Tevera, 2010
neighbouring countries and farther afield. The currency (Zimbabwean dollar) plummeted and forced the government to replace it with the United States (US) dollar.

The situation is coined as ‘dollarization of the economy’. The inflation of the country was described as hyperinflation; this indicates over fifty (50) per cent increases in price. The level of the economy was in the depression phase coupled with a high unemployment rate and high cost of living. The harsh economic conditions and political instability led to persecution, and abduction of the citizens, which later triggered massive exodus and migration to other Western and neighbouring countries. Especially, to the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) countries such as Malawi, Botswana, Namibia, and South Africa to mention but a few.

The Zimbabwean migrant's arrival in South Africa forced the government to extend warm hospitality and promoted Pan Africanism, the ‘principle of *batho pele*’ (people first) and ‘ubuntu’ (humanity towards people) or (I am because we are) to the Zimbabwean migrants (Birmingham, 2008) through the process of migrants legalisation in the country to avoid deportation. Regard to, the South African government introduced permits such as the Dispensation of Zimbabwean Permit (DZP) in 2009, the Zimbabwean Special Permit (ZSP) in 2014 and the Zimbabwean Exception Permit (ZEP) in the year 2017.

However, the extension and renewal over the years resulted in a ‘tug-of-war’ and an exchange of words between the South African officials on one hand and human rights activists, clergies and the civic society on the other. The preceding sections outline the background of the study, methodology, literature review, findings, conclusion and policy implications.

### 4 BACKGROUND TO THE ZIMBABWEAN'S MIGRATION TO SOUTH AFRICA

Economic theory predicts that people tend to migrate from poorer to wealthy areas, so this shouldn't be shocking. It is necessary to discuss immigration policy from a

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19 Okuneye, 2001
20 Noko, 2011; Coomer and Gstraunthaler, 2011
21 Noko, 2012
22 Noko, 2012
23 Hanke and Kwok, 2009
24 Hammar *et al.*, 2010
25 Crush and Tevera, 2010; Meze-Hausken, 2000
few angles. First, migration is a process that needs to be managed by governments. Since there is no "remedy" that governments may implement before moving on to the next issue, it is not a "problem" that they ever "solve." The second is that change is a result of migration. When people migrate, they change; when they come, the host society changes; and when they depart, the sending nation changes.

One reason flexible bureaucracies are necessary to manage migration effectively is that the procedures involved in migration are continual. The most significant takeaway from the history of migration management, however, is that governments need to make sure that migration regulations are in line with the financial interests of all relevant parties, particularly employers and migrants, to effectively manage economically motivated migration. The Zimbabweans' migration to South Africa was not new, they were migrating to work in the South African mines in the olden days and there existed massive cross-border movement between the two countries.26

However, during the political turmoil and economic meltdown in 2008, which triggered massive migration to South Africa, they were received with open arms through the warm hospitality, batho pele principles and ubuntu by the South African government.27 Regards that, the cabinet granted the power to the Department of Home Affairs (DHA) to regularise and legalise the Zimbabwean migrants were not ‘undesirable’ migrants in the country, which placed South Africa on the list of important countries and regional powers for peace and security.28 Almost equally to the ‘refugee rentier states’ notably known to be maintaining peace and order in the regions.29

Since the superpower nations are very interested in peace in the regions to impose their interest on the people (Tsourapas, 2019; Cornelius and Rosenblum, 2005). Below are the stages of the introduction of the ZEP to the current state of the programme. The following section focuses on the history of the dispensation of Zimbabwean Permit (DZP) 2009, Zimbabwean Special Permit (ZSP) 2014, Zimbabwean Exception Project (ZEP) 2017 and the current state of the programme

26 Crush, 2010
27 Birmingham, 2008
28 Brulliard, 2010
29 Cornelius and Rosenblum, 2005
5 DISPENSATION OF ZIMBABWEAN PERMIT, (DZP) 2009

In April 2009 the DHA implemented DZP, which enables the holders of the permit to operate businesses and study in the country as an amnesty. This implies allowing DZP-holders to work, conduct businesses and study in South Africa. The Zimbabwean migrants took advantage of the situation and over 295,000 applied for the permit. However, close to 245,000 permits were issued as a result of meeting the requirements of the DHA, and the DZP is supposed to last for five (5) years. When the expiration date was approaching which was 31 December 2014 the migrants were in limbo which caused anxiety for the DZP-holders about the way forward, especially for those who are not ready to go back home.

Considering the political conditions and turmoil in Zimbabwe and South African foreign policy which embodies Pan-Africanism, the DHA developed a proposal and consulted the Cabinet for the extension of the DZP and it was accepted in August 2014. In launching the DZP the then Minister of Home Affairs stated that: ‘it is in this context, that in recent weeks I have taken note of this anxiety and promised to outline a way forward, after consultation with Cabinet. The Department of Home Affairs developed a proposal, refined in recent months, which was accepted by Cabinet on 6 August 2014 with Section 31(2) of the Immigration Act stipulates that:

Upon application, the Minister may under terms and conditions determined by him: - grant a foreigner or a category of foreigners the rights of permanent residence for a specified or unspecified period when special circumstances exist which would justify such a decision. Provided that the Minister may:

(i) exclude one or more identified foreigners from such categories,

(ii) or with good cause, withdraw such rights from a foreigner or category of foreigners.

Minister of Home Affairs was authorised: ‘for good cause, withdraw an exemption granted by him or her in terms of this section’. The Minister later extended the expiration

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30 Lindsey et al., 2013; De Jager and Musuva, 2016; DHA, 2009
31 De Jager and Masuva, 2016
32 De Jager and Masuva, 2016
33 Zondi, 2015; Hammer et al., 2010; DHA, 2014
34 Home Affairs Minister, 2014. p.2
date to three years from 31 December 2014 and created the new Zimbabwean Special Dispensation Permit or acronym ZSP.35

6 ZIMBABWEAN SPECIAL PERMIT, (ZSP) 2017

On 8 September 2017, the Minister of Home Affairs issued a new statement on the abrogation of the ZSP and a new ZEP was introduced the authorities once again echoed South African humanitarian principles and South African foreign policy, which aims to provide decent immigration services to humanity.36 The ZEP policy was touted as the migration diplomacy corporation, to ensure peace and security in the region, and achieve the National Development Plan (NDP), Vision 2030, which aims to attract special skills in shortage of the country to transfer skills to South Africans.37

Not only that but the policy was also linked to being in line with the White Paper on International Migration Policy approved by the Cabinet which provides a roadmap to the African Union Agenda 2063 concerning the free movement of goods and people.38 To elaborate on the conditions of the new ZEP for 2017 the visa specimen is curled from the DHA to explain it. Below are the conditions in the visa

35 Lindsey et al., 2016; DHA, 2014
36 Zondi, 2015; De Jager and Masuva, 2016).
37 Zarenda, 2013; DHA, 2017
38 Gowreesunker, 2019; Union, 2015; DHA, 2017
7 ZIMBABWEAN EXCEPTION PROJECT (ZEP) 2021

On the extension of the visa to 31 December 2021 the Chairman of Zimbabwean enclaves in South Africa commended the government by postulating that:

“We want to extend our gratitude to the Minister and the South African government for allowing us to remain in South Africa for the next four years. We would have wished that the Minister would have considered the many undocumented Zimbabweans who are working in South Africa. We hope the Minister will at some point attend to this request”.

He moved on to appeal to his co-nationalists that ‘we call on all the holders of the Zimbabwe Special Permit to apply in time for the ZEP’, he echoed. This signifies that the ZEP renewal date was set for 31 December 2021.

7.1 THE CURRENT STATE OF THE PROGRAMME FROM 2021

In 2021 the ZEP renewal coincided with the municipal and national election, moreover, an anti-immigrant party was formed namely Action SA. The party was

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Figure 1

Conditions in the visa

Source: Department of Home Affairs 2014

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39 Tyrberg and Dahlström, 2018
warmly welcomed by the electorates with 16 percent votes for the first participation, meanwhile, the ruling ANC suffered the worst-ever defeat. Politicians elsewhere were accused of migrants to cover up their failure of service delivery and promises on the campaign trail adopted by the anti-immigrant party. The ANC was accused on several platforms of opening the country’s borders to immigrants by the anti-immigrant party (Action SA).

During Cabinet meetings to analyse the electoral outcomes, the decision was taken vehemently not to extend the ZEP which expires on 31 December 2021 but could only be extended for a year for ZEP-holders to migrate to other permits or face possible expulsion. The DHA announced the decision publicly on 29 November 2021 but gave no reason for the termination of the ZEP permits. This drew criticism from the Human rights activists (HRAs) who insisted that the return of Zimbabweans to economic hardships in the country will affect and deteriorate their standard of living and health.

Barely two weeks later, on 13th December 2021, the DHA backtracked by reversing the decision and withdrawing the circulars on their websites about the non-extension of the ZEP permit. This decision was welcomed by the HRAs and other humanitarian organisations. In the words of Sharon Ekambaram, head of the Refugee and Migrant Rights Programme for Lawyers for Human Rights in Johannesburg, states that: ‘It does call for a debate on how we manage movement in the region without infringing on peoples’ human rights and their dignity’, Ekambaram explained.

Surprisingly after two days, there was a news headline by the Mail and Guardian which quoted the DHA and it reads ‘We haven’t reversed the decision to end the Zimbabwean Exemption Permit’. This was shocking and perplexing to the ZEP holders and the Human rights activists. The Minister of Home Affairs whilst being interviewed on Radio 702 maintains that:

there should not be any impression that the decision about terminating the Zimbabwean Exemption Permit – and then giving them a twelve months grace period to apply for other statuses – there is no withdrawal of that decision, he asserted. The Minister continued that: what we have withdrawn is a circular that was issued by officials within the Department of Home Affairs – a circular explaining to the banks what they must do. That circular was wrong; it was not

40 Tyrberg and Dahlström, 2018
41 Ellermann, 2009
42 Mail and Guardian, 2021
43 Mail and Guardian, 2021
44 Hammar et al, 2010; Mail and Guardian, 2021
supposed to be issued. It was causing more confusion. He further emphasised that ‘but the initial decision to end the Zimbabwean Exemption Permit – nothing has changed, and nothing is going to change’, he echoes. For fear of repatriation and harassment by the pressure groups, ZEP-holders and African Amity approached the High Court in Pretoria to order the DHA to renew the ZEP, but the High Court dismissed the application.45

The DHA argued that the applicants did not follow the practice manual and directives and the issue lacked urgency.46 In welcoming the court decision the Minister of Home Affairs states that ‘but litigation over Home Affairs decision far from over’.47 He continued that the DHA will object to any ‘spurious court actions’ targeted to undermine their decision.

8 DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

The international-relations politics on migration was not taken seriously until recently when the international-relations theorists rated migration politics to be ‘low’ rather than ‘high’.48 Even so, researchers and scholars concentrated their research on immigrant countries rather than the emigration countries. One reason could be that the realists and neo-realist tradition treated force displacement, emigration and immigration issues as low politics.49 The politicians across the world use migration as political weapons to cover up their failure to deliver services on their campaign promises,50 due to pressure exerted from their constituents’ members. However, they backtrack on the implementation of deportation when voted into power.51

In Kenya the Somalia refugees were used as ‘football game’ during the election for accusing them for posing security threat to the nation, meanwhile, evidence indicated that they were not a threat.52 In reaction to the Somalia refugees’ accusation as security threats, the Refugees Consortium based in Kenya responded that:

. . . in the run-up to elections many politicians will not hesitate to manipulate the refugee situation as an electioneering gimmick. Members of Parliament have been

45 Mail and Guardian, 2021
46 DHA, 2021
47 Minister of Home Affairs, 2021
48 Wang and Hollifield, 2014
49 Zolberg, 1999
50 Ellermann, 2009
51 Ellermann, 2009
52 Milner, 2009
known to distort facts and stereotypes and vilify refugees as the sole source of increased crime and insecurity, proliferation of illegal arms and scarcity of resources . . .

**Blaming refugees detacts attention from their own responsibilities towards their constituents.**

Meanwhile research indicates that, politicians who accused refugees as danger to security to the Government of Kenya (GOK) were allies to the US who declared ‘war on terror’. As the hospitality and grace periods to the refugees on part of the GOK, run out, the refugees in the cities and towns were demanded to move back to the camps. However, the Kenya Supreme court overruled the encampment acts as a breach and violate the Kenya constitution.

In another development, the legislature may pass laws for mass deportation of migrants known as state-based expulsion as a result of pressure from the local or municipal government or the constituency members. However, the success and failure of such decisions of the parliament depend on the institutional functions of the state whether the country upholds, the rule of law or there are checks and balances as well as separation of powers in place. Countries that are authoritarian and military rule such as the United Arab Emirates, Azerbaijan, Iran, and Libya to mention but few may be successful in passing of acts of deportation, whereas, in democratic states such as the US, Canada and most European countries the courts may block such acts on humanitarian grounds.

A case in point is when the Kenya Supreme Court overruled the encampment force by the Somali refugees that they breached and violated the constitution of Kenya. The court upholds that the encampment proposed by the authorities encroaches on the rights of the Somalis. Further studies indicated that, unions and pressure groups are formed and call on governments to repatriate immigrants during the contraction period especially when the rate of unemployment is high. However, migrants are welcome during the expansion period of the economy.

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54 Milner (2009)
55 The High Court of Kenya, 2013
56 Fitzpatrick, 2005
57 Hollifield, 1992; Joppke, 1998
58 Joppke, 1998
59 The High Court of Kenya, 2013
60 The High Court of Kenya, 2013
61 Durand, Massey and Parrado, 2010
62 Papademetriou et al., 2010; Durand, Massey, and Parrado, 1999
Moreover, in any conflict or negative occurrences in the country in the host nations, migrants are accused of being the perpetrators. A case in point was the study that reveals that sporadic religious conflicts engulfed Nigeria, *popularly known as Kano Riots in 1980s*,63 in response the President Shagari used migration politics of expulsion in the year 1983, and over 1.3 million Ghanaian were deported.64 Moreover, migration expulsion is practised several times in the West African region for various reasons notably among them the low growth of economic activities and the high unemployment rate.65 The deportation that took place in the West African region involves Ghana's deportation of Nigerians in the years 1954 and 1969 as well as Togo's repatriation of Ivorians, Beninese and Nigerians in 1958.66

Migration diplomatic tools and weapons such as deportation, deportability, harassment, repatriation or expulsion and extortion of money are committed towards the migrant directly, but indirectly these acts are directed towards the sending states or the international community to achieve their demands.67 Migration diplomacy is the process of employing political tools, weapons, tactics, processes and procedures involving the use of migration flows as a means to achieve goals in case of a sour relationship with any state.68

A study revealed that the police in some cases raid the migrant enclaves, intimidate them, distort money from them, and harass the migrants and refugees; these were findings in Pakistan against the Afghan refugees during the proof of registration (PoR) extension for only short period of six month.69 According to another study the migrants are regarded in South Africa by the state security officials as automated teller machines (ATMs) where they withdraw money.70 Human Rights Watch documented Afghan refugees’ harassment by the police and about a massacre, which killed several civilians and the refugees were accused of being perpetrators of the crime in the country.71

The campaign of harassment made the Afghan refugees vulnerable, from 2012 to 2016, Pakistan played a ‘cat-and-mouse’ game with the Afghan refugees; during the same

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63 Solomov, 2015  
64 Anarfi, *et al.*, 2003  
65 Peli, 1974  
66 Peli, 1974  
67 Cornelius and Rosenblum, 2005  
68 Tsourapas, 2017  
69 Najafizada and Maroof (2015  
70 Chiliya *et al.*, 2012  
71 Human Rights Watch, 2017
period, the United States nearly doubled aid for refugees in Pakistan from $18 million (2012) to $37 million (2016), while Japan contributed an additional $7 million in emergency aid for Afghan refugees in Pakistan.\textsuperscript{72} While it is clear that many Afghans were expelled (as well as coerced into repatriating), Pakistan’s larger foreign policy goal was largely successful by threatening mass expulsion, creating legal uncertainty and deportability.

Further, states also adopt migration diplomatic policies of permit renewal, PoR and expulsion as was in the case of Afghan refugees in Pakistan. The Pakistan authorities used the renewal methods of six months and one year period as migration politics against the international community to meet their demands.\textsuperscript{73} In the case where permits are renewed, no document is issued to show proof of renewal which makes the refugees subjected to harassment and extortion of money from them by the authorities. A case in point is the PoR renewal in Pakistan, the State Minister and Frontier Regions stated that:

the international community desires us to review this policy but we are clear on this point. The refugees have become a threat to law and order, security, demography, economy and local culture. Enough is enough. If the international community is so concerned, they should open the doors of their countries to these refugees. Afghans will be more than happy to be absorbed by the developed countries, like western Europe, USA, Canada, Australia.\textsuperscript{74}

Then again, the target of sanctioning of remittances of the sending countries are also employed to inflict ‘wounds’ on the economy of the sending country.\textsuperscript{75} Martin postulates that ‘because economic sanctions can impose costs … without carrying the degree of risk attached to military actions’.\textsuperscript{76} Martin elaborated that, ‘governments use them to signal resolve and exert pressure for policy changes’. For example, when the bilateral relationships between the US and Cuba was off balanced, the US laid embargo on the remittances transfer to the Cuba, however, Cubans were transferring the remittances to their neighbouring countries.\textsuperscript{77}

In similar occurrences, the North Korean ballistic missile testing that erupted friction between them and Japan, forced Japan to threaten North Korea about sanctioning

\textsuperscript{72} Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2017
\textsuperscript{73} Shah, 2012
\textsuperscript{74} Shah, 2012.
\textsuperscript{75} Lindsay, 1986; Hufbauer, Schott and Elliot, 1990
\textsuperscript{76} Martin, 1993
\textsuperscript{77} Vanderbush and Haney, 2005
of the remittances transfer estimated between $600 million to $1 billion per year. Further study revealed that in November, 2015 the shooting down of the Russian Su-24M on the Turkish and Syrian border made President Putin laid embargo on the issuance of visa to Turkish, who were seeking employment in Russia. Studies also revealed that Egypt was also at the mercy of Jordan and Libya when they were threaten with the migration diplomacy which forced Egypt to change some of their policies because she relied on the remittances for their economic growth and development. An instance, Tsourapas, coined as ‘migration interdependence’.

The states that are ‘refugees rentier states’ also use migration diplomacy to siphon extra financial aid from the superpower or international community. The refugees’ rentier states are described as the states that are located geographically and share borders with the superpower nations. For example, Turkey shares a border with the European countries. The refugees’ rentier states could employ blackmailing and states such as Jordan, and Lebanon for instance that are not geographically closed to the superpower nation adopts back-scratching to attract financial aid. The back-scratching is the process of seeking assistance or help for the services provided to the migrants from the international community. Tsourapas admitted that this is ‘not a structural variable based on geography alone’, but all of this country cases rely on shared borders with superpowers’.

Turkey President employing threat and blackmailing against the European Union states that ‘we do not have the word ‘idiot’ written on our foreheads’, asserted by the President of Turkey in February, 2016. He continued, ‘we will be patient but we will do what we have to do’, he declared, indicating the country’s readiness to allow Syrian refugees as a leverage against the European countries. ‘Don’t think that the planes and the buses are there for nothing’, he opined. Meanwhile, the recent back scratching by the Jordan was the negotiation in February 2016 about the ‘Jordan Compact’. As a ‘buffer stock’ for the millions of refugees from Syrian since 2011, Jordan was able to negotiate and gained numerous economic benefits from the international community as well as from the super power nations.

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78 Drezner, 2015
79 Tsourapas (2018)
80 Tsourapas, 2019
81 Tsourapas, 2019
82 Presidency, 2016
In return Jordan promised to create employment for the numerous refugees within her borders (Mellinger and van Berlo, 2016). The states that do not serve the geopolitical purpose to qualify as a refugees rentier states can be relevant in migration politics when the super power nations rely on them to shoulder responsibilities to host refugees to curtail the spread of the violence and conflicts in the region.\(^{83}\) This implies such nations become regional power houses and strategically important for peace and security in the region. This is explained by the fact that the super power nations are much interested in the peace and security in the various regions and continents in such a way that their ideas, interest and concepts can be imposed on the people.

The regional states become destination countries that absorb the refugees from the neighbouring states to avoid the escalation of the violence in the region.\(^{84}\) The case of South Africa comes in mind after the demise of apartheid through her hospitality, ‘ubuntu’ (I am because you are) Pan-Africanism and ‘Batho Pele principle’ (people first) on the Africa continent absorbed refugees from neighbouring countries and far afield notably form Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalis Republic of Congo (DRC) to mention but a few.\(^{85}\) Not forgetting the migrants from the Zimbabwean who migrated as a result of economic woes and political upheavals during 2009.\(^{86}\)

The migrants perceived South Africa as ‘safe heaven’, more so, as if gold are used to construct the pavement.\(^{87}\) The aforementioned explanation makes South Africa strategically relevant and significant to the international community. Is South Africa capitalising on their relevance and adopting migration diplomacy against ZEP-holders directly, and indirectly towards international community and super power nations for extending the current ZEP renewal for only one year, and six months or face deportation to meet their demands? This is the question the paper aims to address.

9 AFRICAN MIGRATION DIPLOMACY EXPERIENCES

The adoption of what Tsourapas termed strategies of issue-linkage of the states is another form of migration diplomacy adopted by the states to achieve their goals.\(^{88}\) The

\(^{83}\) Cornelius and Rosenblum, 2005
\(^{84}\) Cornelius and Rosenblum, 2005
\(^{85}\) Maharaj, 2010
\(^{86}\) Crush, 2009
\(^{87}\) Crush 2009
\(^{88}\) Tsourapas, 2019.
issue linkage is the process where the country serves as a transit point for the irregular migrants to another developed country. The North African countries such as Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Morocco and Algeria fall into the category of the issue linkage countries to the West. During the reign of President Gaddafi of Libya when the relationship between Libya and Italy turned sour the illegal migrants were allowed to pass Libya to Italy as a form of migration politics and coercing to allow sanctions against the Libya to be lifted.\(^89\) The situation, Greenhill described as ‘capacity-swamping’, targeting to the state to make their demands to be met.

Greenhill states that Libya openly declared that she would ‘no longer act as Europe’s coast guard’, as the President was eager that sanctions against the country should be lifted.\(^90\) As a result, Lampedusa was ‘filled’ with illegal migrants within shortest possible month via the route of Libya popularly known in migration studies as Central Mediterranean route. Regards to that, on the eve Italy was about to assume the Presidency of the European Union (EU) Council, massive campaign was launched to convince the other members for the arms embargo against Libya to be removed. As it was realised to be the only tactics, tools and weapons that can solve the African irregular migration and within few months embargo was lifted against Libya.\(^91\)

A nation might also employ migration diplomacy such as the weapon of deportability. Deportability is not aims to repatriate the migrants but rather ‘the possibility of deportation’ and subject to lawful violence.\(^92\) States construct the ‘illegality’ of undocumented migrants, which results in vulnerable communities that are exploited for their cheap labour. Undocumented migrants live in fear of deportation and are subjected to intimidation and harassment because of their precarious status. Deportability is constructed by passing laws defining ‘illegality’ and active harassment by the state through road blocks, workplace raids and home arrests. The deportability is adopted with few migrants arrested to send the messages across.

The host country knows that it is costly to engage in the deportation of all the migrants. In the case of Kenya when deportability was employed towards the Somalia refugees to extra financial aid, this is what the authorities said:

\(^{89}\) Greenhill, 2003  
\(^{90}\) Greenhill, 2003  
\(^{91}\) Associated Press, 2003  
\(^{92}\) De Genova, 2002
Dadaab (Daghale, Ifo, Ifo II, Hagdera, Kambios) and Kakuma Refugee Camps should be closed and resident refugees repatriated to their country of origin because of fears that refugee camps were safe havens for terrorist groups.93

Immediately after the threat of deportability United Nations on Human Rights for Refugees (UNHCR), started to negotiate a tripartite agreement between the UN, the Kenya and Somalia government and additional financial aid was granted to the Kenya authorities.94 In a media briefing UNHCR’s representative in Kenya posits that:

it’s very important to underline that no one is forcing Somalis to leave Kenya. The government and people of Kenya have tirelessly provided protection and assistance to Somali refugees for two decades. The agreement we signed on Sunday does not mean Kenya is no longer willing to do so.95

The positive sides of the migration diplomacy practice by the countries is corporation on cross-border mobility of the migrants as was in the case of Gaddafi regime in Libya when he was pursuing the United Arab World dream.96 During the migration corporation the processes of visa were frozen and free movement of goods and services are allowed. President Gaddafi nurturing the idea of Egyptian President Abdel Nasser to unite the Arab world allowed free movement of Tunisians and Egyptians. Author like Vandewalle puts it succinctly that: ‘the self-appointed guardian of Nasser’s legacy nurturing the notion of Arab nationalism and unity’ and Gaddafi was a vocal against the curtailment of free movement in the Middle East.97 And he was quoted to be promoting ‘the unification of all Arabic-speaking people’ as the only way to achieve economic growth and development.98

As the relationship turned sour between Egypt and Libya, Gaddafi resorted to deportation, coercing and placing of embargo on Egyptians migration to Libya.99 The situation forced Egypt withdrawn from the negotiation of the Federal Arab Republic and later on accused Gaddafi of being ‘mentally retarded’ and ‘insane’.100 The barbaric conditions meted out to the Egyptians in Libya forced the then ruling party, Arab Socialist

94 UNHCR, 2013
95 UNHCR, 2013
96 Vandewalle, 2012
97 Vandewalle, 2012
98 Coley, 1982
99 Coley, 1982
100 Rohen, 2008.
Union parliamentarians for the repatriation of all Egyptians in Libya which were estimated to be 300,000.\footnote{Mena, 1975} Later, Libya reported to adopt the practice of mass deportation against the Egyptians irrespective of their status. This implies whether the Egyptian migrants were legal or illegal they must be deported.

Each day over 10,000 Egyptians were deported and the then Governor of Marsa Matrouh received the migrants back into Egypt.\footnote{Mena, 1975} In another development when Tunisia President Habib Bourguiba’s visited Washington DC in the August 1985, over 5000 Tunisian workers in Libya belongings were seized and confiscated to either declare to be ‘Arab nationality’ or face repatriation to Tunisia. This development forced the Tunisia diplomats to state that these actions ‘were intended to put pressure on Tunis to cut ties with the West’ (Fawat 1985).

President Gaddafi became less interested in United Arab World from 1990’s and once again extended migration corporation to other African states such as Sudan and Chad in 1998 to achieve his Pan-Africanism or United African States agenda and led to the establishment of Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) details free migration of people (Fawat, 1995). The free movement of the people in the European countries apart from Britain as well as the Economic community of West Africa (ECOWAS) are typical examples of migration corporations.

10 RESEARCH FINDINGS

The findings reveal that migration politics such as harassment, deportability, pressure groups, political parties’ accusations of the migrants and the current one year renewal of the ZEP and six months extension are used as political weapons and tools against the Zimbabwean migrants. On the harassment in 2010 Agence France-Presse carried a banner headline in June 2010, which reads as ‘Zimbabwean refugees face crime, harassment in South Africa’ (Global Post, 2010). Commenting on the harassment and deportability Bruillard (2010) asserts that the behaviour of South Africa is confusing.

Diplomatically, South Africa promised to protect the Zimbabweans through the easing of the permit, at the same time the illegal migrants are arrested and harassed irrespective of moratorium on deportation. This finding is in support of Cornelius and
Rosenblum whose study confirmed that the states that are hosts to refugees, asylum seekers, economic and non-economic migrants adopt migration diplomacy such as harassment and deportability for their demands to be heard and recognised on the global stage.103

The pressure groups and vigilante such as Operation Dulula and #PutSouthAfricaFirst emerged and exerted excessive pressure on the government to deport the foreigners from the country.104 This finding is not different from what Durand, Massey and Parrado found that during the contraction periods of the economy the host nation’s, pressure groups and union’s demands the expulsion of the migrant.105 The finding not different from the South African situation since the vigilante group like Operation Dulula attacking the migrants enclaves and demanding their passports which led to the death of Elvis Nyathi a Zimbabwean migrant in Diepsloot.106

Political party such as Action SA formed with the objective to ‘clean up’ the city of Johannesburg through the measures of deporting the immigrants. The leaders also accused the migrants to be the cause of high level of unemployment rate of 34.7 percent in South Africa.107 This finding support the studies of Ellermann who pointed out that the political parties usually accuse the migrants of being the woes and plight of the host countries to cover up their campaign promises failure. Also Milner found out in Somali refugees’ camps in Kenya that the host employed expulsion and repatriation to achieve their goals.

11 CONCLUDING REMARK

The economic meltdown and political upheaval forced Zimbabweans migrated to South Africa, since she serves as regional power for peace and security. Hospitality and ‘ubuntu’ implies ‘humanity towards others’ or ‘I am because we are’ extended to Zimbabwean migrants resulted in DZEP introduction in order to legalise them not to be undesirable migrants. In 2014 the permit was changed to ZSP and lasted for three years which expired in 2017. The renewal was extended to 2021 with new name ZEP. However, in 2021 as an election year anti-immigration party was formed which performed well on

103 Cornelius and Rosenblum (2005)
104 SABC, 2021
105 Durand, Massey and Parrado (2010)
106 South Africa Broadcasting Corporation, 2022
107 Statistics South Africa [Stats, SA], 2021
the poll and saw the ANC for the first time performed dismally in the national and municipal election.

As a result, cabinet voted to scrap the extension of the ZEP. It was decided to be extended for only one year after which the ZEP-holders who could not renew their visa might face possible deportation but extended again to 30 June, 2023 and another six months to 31 December, 2023. Is South Africa coercing or leveraging through migration diplomacy? The finding revealed that migration politics such as harassment, deportability, springing up of anti-immigrant pressure groups and political parties, and short-term renewal of permits are adopted by the South African government.

However, whether the aforementioned migration diplomacy is undertaken to achieve specific goals remains blurred since South Africa recently extended the ZEP for one year and another six months or face deportation. The paper therefore recommends that empirical studies may be taken to unravel some of the hidden intentions that this study does not reveal.

12 POLICY IMPLICATIONS

The emergence of the vigilante group Operation Dulula as well as pressure group #Put South Africa First must be disbanded by the state to avoid attacks on the migrants. If the citizens have issues concerning the migrants appropriate channels need to be followed to address it, for the country is governed by the constitution. Moreover, the high rate of unemployment which is skyrocketing as well as service delivery that is at its lowest ebb, hence, the indigenous accusation of the migrants for ‘taking their jobs’ may be solved or reduced if job creation by the state can be prioritised.

Further, state institutions must be effective and implementation of checks and balances in the arms of the government to ensure nepotism, bribery and corruption are reduced, so that funds that lining up in individual pockets can be used to develop the communities. Because, corruption is a ‘devil’ that kills the future of unborn children, the educational system, health sector and affects every citizen of the state.
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